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Photography, Tragedy and Osama Bin Laden 
 
Looking at the enemy 
 
 
 
 The production of Antigone, directed by Polly Findlay, in London’s National 
Theatre in the summer of 2012, placed the play in an oblique relationship with the 
ongoing war in Afghanistan.  As the play opened with the sound of a helicopter whirring 
overhead, the ensemble appeared to be anxiously master-minding a battle in an 
underground war room, checking screen monitors, collecting and delivering paper 
messages issuing from fax machines, criss-crossing the stage with ever-increasing 
urgency. Then briefly the actors all gathered around one desk and watched a close-circuit 
television in a rare moment of stillness. On the day I saw the play, the tableau vivant 
produced a gasp of recognition from the audience.  It was a visual echo of the well-
known photograph by White House photographer Pete Souza of Barack Obama, Hillary 
Clinton and the national security team in the situation room watching the capture and 
killing of Osama Bin Laden. 
 
 The reference to Osama Bin Laden illuminated something new in the Sophocles 
play, and – most importantly – vice versa.  The stage business, of course, was designed to 
indicate the war between Eteocles and Polyneices, the action immediately before the play 
opens.  By suggesting a contemporary setting in the ‘war on terror’, the director was 
nudging the audience towards seeing Polyneices and his allies as ‘insurgents’ or 
‘terrorists’ and Creon as ‘our’ leader, desperately trying to prosecute a complex, 
ambiguous war. So far, so not unusual.  What was innovative was the issue of image-
making itself which the tableau raised by its allusion to the situation room picture, and 
the self-conscious connection between theatre and photography. 
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The Pete Souza photograph is interesting because it focuses on the witnesses of 
the action on the television, rather than on the CCTV footage to which they were 
supposedly attending. Indeed, there has subsequently been speculation on what exact 
moment of the special operation the national security team was watching when the 
photograph was taken. What was it that made Hillary Clinton raise her hand to her mouth, 
to cover her horror, her anxiety, or her cough?
i
  The central subject of the event – Osama 
Bin Laden himself – is missing from the photograph; the television is turned away from 
the image’s spectator.  The occlusion of Bin Laden continued with the decision to dispose 
of his body at sea. There was, therefore, no official photograph of the killing of Osama 
Bin Laden. There was no verified image of his dead body. Polly Findlay’s production of 
Antigone made strikingly visible, through a fleeting reference to an occluded image, the 
invisibility of one of the great ‘enemies’ of our time. 
 
This essay brings together three central concerns – tragic drama (focusing 
particularly on Antigone), photography (looking at recent images of the war in 
Afghanistan) and ethics (especially the work of Emmanuel Levinas, Susan Sontag and 
Judith Butler) – to consider the importance of the visual in tragic theatre, tragic theory 
and images of tragic events. I want to investigate the relative significance of what is seen 
in tragic theatre and photography and what is left unseen.  The citizen body is formed 
through the act of recognition, which both tragic drama and the tragic photograph 
demand, but this act is complicated by areas of occlusion or omission or indeed 
misrecognition, and also by the underlying political pressures of loyalty or enmity. I 
argue that the ambiguous implications of spectatorship in theatre and photography are 
similar particularly in the way viewers of tragic drama or photography negotiate the 
complex dynamics inherent in the tragic response defined by Aristotle. The essay 
therefore begins by considering three central terms in Aristotle’s Poetics, exploring their 
continuing resonance in ethical and visual theory and tracing their implications in recent 
photography and ancient Greek tragedy. Firstly, I consider recognition, a term used by 
Aristotle and by Levinas, which is central to their respective theoretical ideas but which 
has an ambiguous purchase on the visual. Secondly, issues relating to catharsis raise 
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questions about the function and purpose of viewing the pain of others. And finally, the 
role of fear, which is a crucial component of Aristotle’s account of tragic response but 
which is often overlooked, disturbs the account of Levinas’s ethics and Judith Butler’s 
‘shared precarity’ while it plays an ambiguous part in the viewing and circulation of war 
photography today.
ii
  These three aspects of Aristotelian tragic theory will then allow us 
to re-think the connection between tragic drama and the tragic photograph and the 
complicated process of looking at the enemy in the contemporary war in Afghanistan.
iii
  
 
Recognising with Aristotle 
 
 According to Aristotle, anagnorisis or ‘recognition’ is a crucial component of 
tragedy, along with reversal (peripeteia) and suffering (pathos). Recognition does not 
necessarily carry a visual meaning in Aristotle. Indeed, Aristotle’s views on the 
importance of viewing drama in the theatre are ambiguous: ‘the plot-structure ought to be 
so composed that, even without seeing a performance, anyone who hears the events 
which occur will experience terror and pity as a result of the outcome’.iv  But the 
emphasis upon the visual in Greek drama was striking, both in the architecture of the 
theatre itself and in the metaphors of revelation evident in the play texts. The Greek word 
for theatre – theatron – means literally ‘the place for seeing things’, and the stage 
machinery known as the ekkyklema allowed the dead bodies – victims of the drama’s 
business– to be wheeled out and displayed for collective mourning, by the protagonists, 
chorus and audience.   The chorus, nearly always continuously present in the orchestra 
after their first entry, made the process of witnessing events self-consciously pressing 
upon the audience’s attention.v  And in many plays, the revelatory process of the plot in 
moving from ignorance to knowledge was described in visual terms. So it is fitting that 
Aristotle elaborates upon his theory of recognition by invoking the function of visual 
signs as evidence: the identifying scar by which the nurse recognises Odysseus as she 
washes his feet or the ritual signs, by Agamemnon’s tomb, that the exiled Orestes has 
returned. (Chap. XVI. 48-9) 
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 It is the act of recognition that Emmanuel Levinas also makes central to his 
concept of the ethical process of relational living: ‘The third party looks at me in the eyes 
of the Other […] the epiphany of the face qua face opens humanity’.vi   Like Aristotle, 
Levinas held an ambiguous view of the relation between recognition and literal viewing, 
since the face depicted in art was ‘of the order of the seen’, an ‘object’, and not an 
‘encounter’.vii Indeed, it has been argued that Levinas deconstructs or even ‘ruptures’ any 
concrete figuration or stable signification, and that his force resides in the notion of 
absolute alterity.
viii
  The ‘face’, in other words, might be understood metaphorically in 
Levinas as the concept of the particular, somatic and expressive identity of the Other 
which appeals to one, rather than literally and concretely so.  But, as Judith Butler notes, 
if Levinas’s claim is really that ‘it is the face of the other that demands from us an ethical 
response, then it seems that the norms that would allocate who is and is not human arrive 
in visual form’.ix  Butler takes up Levinas to interrogate and extend the notion of what 
she calls our ‘common human vulnerability’ (30), based upon a mutual recognition of 
‘what is precarious in another life or, rather, the precariousness of life itself’ (133).  A 
sense of interdependence should be foundational to the constitution of the citizen body. I 
wish to develop Levinas’s and Butler’s views further by considering the ethical 
implications of the act of visual recognition both in tragic drama and in photographs that 
could be described as tragic.   
 
 Just as tragic drama reminds its audience of the material consequences of 
particular decisions – the bodies rolled out to view – so photographs confront their 
viewers with the need to recognise the embodied repercussions of war and violent action. 
‘Photographs alter and enlarge our notions of what is worth looking at and what we have 
the right to observe. They are a grammar and, even more importantly, an ethics of 
seeing’, Susan Sontag observed in On Photography.x  Twenty five years later, she 
claimed that such ‘seeing’ is the starting point for moral activism and to ignore shocking 
images of suffering is to be guilty of ‘moral defectiveness’:  
Let the atrocious images haunt us. Even if they are  
only tokens and cannot possibly encompass most of  
the reality to which they refer, they still perform a  
  
5 
5 
vital function. The images say: This is what human beings  
are capable of doing – may volunteer to do, enthusiastically, 
 self-righteously. Don’t forget.xi   
The empathy invited by looking at photographs should be a crucial component in human 
rights activism.  Without empathy, as Susie Linfield has argued recently, ‘the politics of 
human rights devolve into abstraction, romantic foolishness, and cruelty’.xii 
 
 As we look at images of suffering, we are forced to think about the human 
consequences of what might seem a ‘clinical strike’ in war.  But visual images also raise 
the issue of the limits of understanding and compassion. As Linfield observes, ‘in 
bringing us close, photographs also illuminate the unbridgeable chasm that separates 
ordinary life from extraordinary experiences of political trauma. In this sense, 
photographs teach us about our failure – our necessary failure – to comprehend the 
human’.xiii  Recognition, in photography or in drama, can involve acknowledging, or 
indeed failing to acknowledge, the inability to understand the Other, and by extension the 
human condition. For Stanley Cavell, recognising other people and the external world 
would involve a degree of self-recognition or revelation which could be devastating, 
since it requires a debilitating acknowledgement of our own limitedness. So, whereas for 
Levinas, epistemological resistance from the Other actually results in an opening up, a 
‘putting into question’, according to Cavell separate existence in Shakespeare is met by 
an act of deflection or even a closing down in fear or death-dealing jealousy or blind 
possessiveness.  Tragedy results from the ‘terrible doubt’ which itself covers ‘a yet more 
terrible certainty’, that, for example, Desdemona is ‘flesh and blood; is separate from 
[Othello]; other’.xiv The ‘ocular proof’ (Othello. III.iii.365) for which Othello hungers is 
actually a substitution for the more terrible, hidden recognition of what cannot be seen, 
the once intact body of Desdemona.  The audience also has difficulty ‘recognising’ or 
acknowledging what is in front of them, partly being ‘shouldered out from our ways of 
thinking and speaking by a torment of reality’ but then partly deflecting it again with the 
language of analysis or tragic theory or philosophical scepticism.
xv
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 Scepticism can sometimes be overcome with sympathy, but the function of 
compassion in the viewing of tragic drama or photography is far from unproblematic.  
The problem can be located in Aristotle’s notion of catharsis, cryptic as that is in his 
Poetics: ‘through the arousal of pity and fear [tragedy] effect[s] the katharsis of such 
emotions’. (Chap. VI. p. 37). However the phrase is translated – and the Greek is 
ambiguous - the emphasis falls upon the beneficial effect for the viewer rather than for 
the sufferer of tragedy. Tragic experience is offered up for the consumption of the 
audience.  As numerous commentators have noted, what is enormously painful for the 
protagonist in tragedy becomes paradoxically a source of pleasure for the viewer.  The 
dichotomy registers the moment when ethics becomes aesthetics. This process is alluded 
to in Greek tragedy, in, for example, its description of virginal deaths.  The chorus uses 
strangely aesthetic terms to describe the sacrifice of Iphigenia in Agamemnon: 
 Her yellow-dyed dress streaming to the ground, 
 she struck each sacrificer with a bolt from her eyes 
 to move compassion; she stood out clearly      
 as in a picture (ὡς ἐν γραφαῖς ), wanting to call them by name…xvi 
The chorus compares the scene to a picture partly because Iphigenia is gagged and cannot 
make a sound but mainly because this sight is the source of appeal, the attempt to ‘move 
compassion’ being the object itself of beauty. The additional irony, here, of course is the 
fact that almost certainly the chorus did not, and could not, see the scene, since they were, 
presumably, left behind in Argos.  Another sacrifice, that of Polyxena in Hecuba, is 
described by the messenger, Talthybius, thus:  
 When she heard this order of the master, she took hold of her dress and  
 tore it from the top of her shoulder to the middle of her waist by the navel.  
 Her lovely breasts and bosom were revealed like a statue’s (ὡς ἀγάλματος),  
 and sinking to her knees upon the ground she spoke the most heartrending  
 words of all. ‘Look at me! If you are eager to strike this bosom, young 
 Neoptolemus, strike it now’.xvii  
Both these examples illustrate how witnesses on the stage view extreme suffering, and 
analogously suggest how an audience might respond too. In both cases an individual’s 
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suffering is transformed into a work of art in order to create an effect upon the viewer, 
implying a certain pleasure in the description and the carefully composed scene. 
 
 Viewing photographs of agony can raise issues of distance, indifference and 
power that are similar to the questions about audience and catharsis that trouble critics of 
tragic drama. According to Susan Sontag back in the ‘70s, ‘cameras miniaturise 
experience, transform history into spectacle. As much as they create sympathy, 
photographs cut sympathy, distance the emotions’.xviii   One might think, for example, of 
the beautifully composed photographs of Eugene Smith, such as ‘The Wake’ (1950) or 
‘Tomoko Uemura in her Bath’ (1972), in which the sorrow or suffering experienced by 
the subjects is transformed into a ‘picture’ for the admiration of the viewer.xix  With a 
critique of ‘liberal’ sensitivity worthy of Brecht’s distaste for what he considered the 
bourgeois self-indulgent yearning for catharsis, the radical artist Martha Rosler 
uncovered, in the early 1980s, the documentary photograph’s strategy of ‘implor[ing] us 
to look in the face of deprivation and weep’: ‘The liberal documentary assuages any 
stirrings of conscience in its viewers the way scratching relieves an itch and 
simultaneously reassures them about their relative wealth and social position’, she 
maintained.
xx
    
 
 Brecht sought to detach his audience from any identification with the emotional 
experience of his characters through the use of so-called alienation techniques, which 
drew attention to the constructed nature of the drama. In a similar manner, to avoid the 
unreflective identification with the subject matter, postmodern approaches to 
photography since the 1980s have focused upon the self-conscious questioning of the act 
of image-making itself as the topic of inquiry.
xxi
 The photographs, for example, of Gilles 
Peress of the Iranian revolution in 1979 were designed to be hard to read, ambiguous and 
often confusing.
xxii
 New York Times critic Andy Grundberg observed their ‘implicit 
abandonment of any moral position’: ‘As an outsider [Peress] found the events in Iran 
incomprehensible, and the pictures he made there […] are documents of that 
incomprehension’. xxiii  
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 The self-ironising quality of these photographs corresponds with the self-reflexive 
gesture, drawing attention to its own medium, delineated by Judith 
Butler in Frames of War.   The political attempt to control journalistic reporting of 
conflict since Vietnam, together with the increased dangers of a more technological form 
of warfare, has changed the nature of war photography in the last decade. Western 
journalists are now ‘embedded’ with western troops. For Butler, this is the unseen ‘frame’ 
of the photograph. Drawing attention to the power dynamics behind the medium is her 
task.  It is interesting, in this context, to note the self-reflexive nature of recognition in 
literature, and particularly tragic drama, according to Terence Cave. ‘To tell a story’, he 
observes, ‘which ends in recognition is to perform one of the most quintessential of all 
acts of fictional narration – the recognition is, as it were, the mark or signature of a 
fiction’.xxiv  Some photography, with its complex manipulation of the gaze, can expose 
the ‘frame’.  In this case, it is a question of looking at the looking or even looking at the 
not looking. Making the viewer aware of the complicated pitfalls of viewing, and the 
problematic relationship between ethics and aesthetics, might therefore be considered one 
of the challenges of tragic representation. 
 
 However, my analysis so far of the recent writing on photography and its 
connections with thinking about tragic drama, is only concerned with the victims. Such 
writing assumes that the business of tragedy, and that of ethical viewing, is to ‘enlarge’ 
our capacity to feel pity and to galvanise our capacity to reflect upon  – and maybe 
prevent – the suffering of others.xxv For Emmanuel Levinas, the act of recognition results 
in respect; the process is all about non-violence and peace, conjuring up responsibility 
and freedom in through the encounter with others:  
 The face in which the other – the absolute other – presents himself  
 does not negate the same, does not do violence to it […] It remains  
 commensurate with him who welcomes; it remains terrestrial.  
 This presentation is preeminently nonviolence, for instead of  
 offending my freedom it calls it to responsibility and founds it.
xxvi
 
Judith Butler also assumes that recognition of our common state of precariousness will 
result in reciprocal tolerance and interdependency.  
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 But what about the perpetrators of war and suffering? The limits of toleration? 
And what about the role of fear?  Aristotle, after all, wrote that tragedy ‘through the 
arousal of pity and fear effect[s] the katharsis of such emotions’ (Chap. VI.p. 37). He 
sees the polarisation of tragic response into pity and fear or into friends and enemies as a 
fundamental consequence of the act of recognition, arguing that ‘recognition […] is a 
change from ignorance to knowledge, bringing characters into either a close bond, or 
enmity, with one another’ (Chap. XI.p.43). On the one hand, the fear is based upon a 
recognition of common human fallibility, (a man ‘like ourselves’), resulting therefore in a 
situation rather like Butler’s recognition of our shared precariousness.  But on the other 
hand, Aristotle suggests that fear can produce enmity, since friends or enemies are 
structurally closer than those who have no connection at all (Chap. IV.p. 46) and the 
shared recognition can be of enmity and terror. In that case, the act of recognition might 
be said to make the world ‘intelligible’ by ‘stratifying it’, leading to injustice and patterns 
of subordination and dominance, as Patchen Markell has argued recently.
xxvii
 Tragic fear, 
then, both reduces difference and exacerbates it, resulting sometimes in Butler’s shared 
vulnerability and sometimes in Markell’s ‘semblance of sovereign agency at others’ 
expense’ (5).   At the very least, Greek tragedy considers the norms of amity or enmity 
that are produced by the act of recognition and brings to our scrutiny the question of 
whether this polarisation is inevitable. If the images from Afghanistan are considered in 
the light of Greek tragedy, they can also raise questions about fear and recognition and 
the complicated function of bearing witness in a conflict zone for the formation of the 
citizen body. 
 
Looking (or not looking) at Bin Laden 
 
  Two of the main concerns in Antigone are the questions of how one treats one’s 
enemies and what is the proper way to dispose of the dead.  While Greek tragedy avoided 
onstage violence, it did place great emphasis upon looking at dead bodies after violence 
had occurred. The invitation to look was often accompanied with an appeal to the justice 
or injustice of the death, or the improbable simplification of the relationship with the dead 
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into friendship or enmity. Thus Clytemnestra shows the bodies of Agamemnon and 
Cassandra, clarifying that they are ‘enemies who had seemed to be friends’ (Agamemnon, 
1374-5), and in the next play in the trilogy Orestes shows the bodies of Clytemnestra and 
Aegisthus, displayed with the same net in which Clytemnestra trapped his father 
(Libation Bearers, 973-89). And similarly, at the end of Antigone, Creon brings out the 
body of Haemon for public mourning, highlighting his close identification with his son: 
‘You look at us the killer and the killed / of the one blood’.xxviii  By contrast, while Creon 
attends eventually to the proper burial of Polyneices, he does not bring his body out on 
stage or offer it that public act of witnessing and mourning. As far as Creon is concerned, 
there is still a division between friends and enemies, indicated by that onstage or offstage 
recognition.  
 
 However, although Polyneices’ body is never seen, we hear about it throughout 
the play, lying exposed to the sun, stinking so much that the guards must station 
themselves upwind of it, eaten by animals and vomited up over the city’s altars by birds. 
The body polarises opinion, for while Creon desires to make it a ‘an obscenity to behold’ 
(αἰκισθέν τ᾽ἰδεῖν: 206), Antigone wishes to ‘join in love, not hate’ (οὔτοι συνέχθεῖν, ἀλλὰ 
συμφιλεῖν: 523) , and Ismene’s and the guard’s reactions are different again.  While 
Ismene thinks Antigone is out of her mind (ἄνους), to disobey Creon by burying it, she is 
still ‘rightly (ὀρθῶς: 99) dear to those who love [her]’. Ismene’s ‘ὀρθῶς’ functions here 
to interrogate the very notion of orthodoxy, and indeed, as Simon Goldhill has pointed 
out recently, Ismene serves to complicate the notion of what is ‘common’ (κοινὸν: 1) and 
normal in the play.
xxix
  Despite Creon’s attempted simplifications, therefore, the unseen 
body of Polyneices radically challenges the easy conventions of loyalty and enmity which 
war apparently demands.  
 
 Contrary to the treatment of Polyneices in Antigone, we heard very little about 
Bin Laden’s body. True, the very recent best-selling account by ‘Mark Owen’, the Navy 
Seal who was in the team that killed Bin Laden, spends some time describing the body, 
his uncertainty over whether it was indeed Bin Laden’s corpse, his efforts to verify it and 
the transportation of it into the helicopter out of the compound. The examination of the 
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body seemed to involve some rough treatment, described with the violence associated 
with the age-old, traditional disrespectful treatment of an enemy’s body:  Owen ‘pull[ed] 
his beard to the right and then the left’, ‘peeled back the eyelid, exposing his now lifeless 
brown eye’, ‘jammed [a cotton swab] in Bin Laden’s mouth to get a saliva sample’, 
‘slammed my syringe into the fleshy part of Bin Laden’s thigh’, and ‘pulled [the body 
bag] off the truck [where] it flopped on the cement floor like a dead fish’.xxx  In other 
respects, ‘Mark Owen’ engaged in familiar tactics when confronting the body of an 
enemy, dwelling on his effeminacy as evidenced by Bin Laden’s apparent use of hair dye. 
(248).  But the prevailing theme in his account is the discrepancy between the popular 
image of Bin Laden and the dead body he witnessed. (241).  He actually took many 
photos of Bin Laden as part of his verifying evidence that he had indeed killed ‘the most 
wanted man in the world’. But a decision was taken by the White House not to release the 
photographs nor to give any details, visual or descriptive, of the disposal of the body at 
sea. The absence of officially verified images of Bin Laden’s dead body ensured that the 
discrepancy between the image of the ‘world’s most wanted man’ and his physical 
remains continued in the public imagination.  
  
  In contrast with Osama Bin Laden, of course, the fate of Saddam Hussein was 
widely disseminated. Indeed, many believed it was far too visible.  First, footage was 
released of a disheveled, confused Saddam being subjected to medical examination, his 
hair checked for fleas and his mouth probed open ostensibly to look for a hidden cyanide 
capsule but implicitly to humiliate. There was a televised trial, which continued for a 
little over a year, from October 2005 until November 2006.  And then finally the 
execution by hanging, officially filmed by the Iraqi state television news agency up until 
the moment of actual execution. An amateur video, shot on a mobile phone by one of the 
guards, actually showed the entire hanging, complete with the shouted taunts by the other 
guards.  It was allegedly to avoid the complicated fallout of the treatment of Saddam – 
the accusations of degradation, the adulation of a martyr – that the decision was taken to 
allow Osama Bin Laden’s body to disappear, so that there would be no reprisals on 
American forces nor the transformation of Bin Laden’s grave into a martyr’s shrine. 
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 The contrasting approaches to the deaths of Osama Bin Laden and Saddam 
Hussein highlight the dilemma about how to treat the death of one’s enemies. In the latter 
case, the body was displayed for mockery; in the former, the body arguably was not given 
the respect of a public funeral. These two specific cases bring into focus the problem of 
the visibility or invisibility of the enemy, and the consequent formation of the viewing 
citizen body, whether it is bolstered by mockery, scorn or the affect of neglect.   The 
deaths of Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein need to be set in the context of our general 
image – or lack of images – of the supposed enemies in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Before 
this can be done, however, we need to consider the sources of these images, those who 
click the camera shutter. Complicating the issue now is the proliferation of images, the 
emergence of so-called citizen journalists and the distinction between them and 
professional journalists. How is tragic representation controlled, organised and used to 
regulate or interrogate fear when images are circulated via so many sources?  How does 
the comparison with tragic drama allow us to re-examine this new phenomenon, 
multifarious as it is? 
 
With Western journalists now ‘embedded’ with western troops, there are 
relatively few pictures of the ‘enemy’ shot by professional photographers; the images are 
mostly shot from the perspective of the American or British military.  But professional 
photographers are all too aware of the constraints and often think of ways of indicating, 
and thereby paradoxically eluding, the ‘frame’. In contrast, amateur photographers – 
citizens, other soldiers – are likely to be immersed in the situation, participants in some 
way, who consequently get so-called privileged access to the scene and the circulation of 
whose images is independent of their original context. For Judith Butler to term those 
who took the photographs in Abu Ghraib ‘embedded reporters’ is therefore to conflate 
and confuse two very different situations and to misrepresent the work of serious, 
professional photographers.
xxxi
     
 
Tim Hetherington’s and Peter van Agtmael’s award winning photographs from 
Afghanistan, for example, were taken when they were embedded with the US military 
and necessarily show an American perspective on the war. But Hetherington’s images, 
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many of which show literally and punningly the American soldiers in bed asleep, 
combine a surprising intimacy in the war zone with a sense of the vulnerability and 
questionable purpose behind the western campaign.
xxxii
   This is subtly, as one 
commentator put it, ‘the other side of Afghanistan.’xxxiii Meanwhile, Magnum 
photographer Peter Van Agtmael shot soldiers at work in Iraq and Afghanistan, either 
tenderly caring for their wounded comrades or indifferently standing by as enemy 
combatants are taken prisoner or their houses are violently searched.
xxxiv
  He has 
commented: ‘My photographs are primarily about contradictions; the simultaneous and 
infinite coexistence of beauty mingling with destruction, of love with hatred. The endless 
capacity for contradiction has defined humanity’s existence, and is forced into stark relief 
in war.’xxxv The work of these professional photographers, and others like them, seeks to 
critique the partiality of our viewpoint from within, composing the events for our 
collective reflection and simultaneously commenting ironically upon them. 
 
But the images that have most attracted the attention and reflection of the public 
have been taken not by professional photographers but by soldiers, and in ways that make 
them very hard to read. Much has been written on the set of scandalous images from Iraq: 
the torture of prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison.
xxxvi
 In particular, commentators have 
focused upon the double invisibility of the photographs, the extent to which the solders in 
the photographs and the ones who took the photographs were inviting each other to share 
in their ‘fun’, without seeing the humiliation suffered by Iraqi prisoners, and the fact that 
the behaviour was excused and explained away by a regime who could not see that it was 
dependent upon the very ideology which could not look properly at the photograph.   The 
soldiers immersed in the situation that they photograph are like Nietzsche’s 
conceptualisation of the tragic chorus, the chorus which experiences and participates in 
the tragic business, and even generates it, rather than spectating and analysing from a 
distance: ‘the sole “reality” is the chorus, which generates the vision from within itself, 
and speaks of it with all the symbolism of dance, sound and words.’xxxvii  
 
However, the similarly scandalous image of US marines urinating on the bodies 
of three dead Taliban fighters, which came to public attention in January 2012, has not 
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received much critical attention.  A 39-second video, filmed presumably by another 
soldier, was posted on YouTube and subsequently still images from the video were 
published in newspapers around the world.  The faces of the dead and the genitals of the 
Americans were pixilated in the published pictures, in order to preserve some notion of 
decency, (on which more later), and to prevent the troubling repercussions of the 
identification of the dead. But the video footage still included the audible taunts of the 
dead by the Americans.  There was an immediate outcry. Killing the Taliban was 
commendable; pissing on them was not.  General Adrian Bradshaw, deputy commander 
of the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) in Afghanistan, was quick and 
clear-cut in his response: ‘any action which treats the dead with disrespect is deplorable.’ 
According to the Geneva Convention, once an enemy combatant has died, in effect, he is 
no longer to be considered hostile but is to be regarded as representing the humanity 
which we hold in common, to be treated with respect.  This is, of course, in contrast to 
Creon’s formulation in Sophocles’ play, that ‘Never can an enemy become a friend, not 
even when he dies’ (522).  (As an aside, it is interesting to note that war reverses the 
conventional polarisation between ‘significance’ and ‘physical nature’ demarcated by 
death, which Walter Benjamin described.
xxxviii
 According to the rules of war, human 
significance is only accorded an enemy fighter once he has died).  The response from the 
American embassy in Kabul was a little more complex: ‘such actions are reprehensible, 
dishonour the sacrifices of our military and the American people, and violate the core 
values of both our societies’, said Gavin Sundwall, the embassy spokesman.xxxix  His 
response was interesting in that it placed the emphasis upon the ‘dishonour’ done to the 
‘American people’ by the soldier’s actions, rather than upon the dishonour done to the 
Taliban/Afghans.  In other words, he managed to distance himself from the soldiers until 
they became the ‘violators’, or the enemy, and yet at the same time he did not name the 
Afghans as the appropriate recipients of honour, and therefore, by extension, friends. 
Reading the photograph was complicated – who were the friends? who were the enemies? 
– and Sundwall’s gloss on the process was masterly in its entangled logic. 
 
The pissing soldiers in Afghanistan were not looking at the camera, yet their 
taunts, captured on the audio soundtrack, suggest a performance, undertaken 
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competitively with each other and for the edification of the unseen recorder of the event.  
Susan Sontag observed that nowadays ‘to live is also to pose’ and that the photo acts as a 
circulated trophy, disseminated to the social networks.
xl
 The prevailing culture exposed 
by these images, however, is not so different from Revenge tragedy with its tradition of 
the triumphant mockery of the dead and its inherently performative quality.
xli
 I am 
interested, too, in the boundaries of decency assumed by the publication of the 
photograph. The action of urination is not hidden. The faces of the marines are clear, 
even if two are semi-covered by helmets and the other two wear dark glasses, but their 
genitals are pixelated.  The message is that the viewer can look at torture and abuse, and 
at the bodies of dead Taliban, but not at the naked human member. One is reminded of 
Agave’s question to her father at the end of the Bacchae, after she has torn apart the body 
of her son: 
Agave: Where is the dear body of my son, father? 
Cadmus: (pointing to the stretcher): Here I bring it after  
a difficult search.  
Agave: Has it been properly (‘καλῶς’) fitted together,  
limb with limb?  
 Cadmus: ----- ----------------- [text missing] 
xlii
 
Cadmus’s answer to Agave is missing, the textual lacuna here registering, perhaps all too 
conveniently, an ethical aporia. The extent to which anything can be considered ‘καλῶς’, 
‘proper’ or decent after the events of the Bacchae is hard to imagine. In fact, the critical 
consensus is now that Agave did somehow fit the body together on stage. If this were the 
case, one could read it as an empty gesture of aestheticising violence, ironically 
attempting to make the scattered parts fit into an orderly, attractive, figural pattern. The 
concern with decency in the photograph of the marines in Afghanistan smacks of a 
similar redundancy, setting aside the larger issue of violation in the attempt to make the 
image appropriate for the sensibilities of a Western audience. 
 
What do we see when we look at the bodies of the Taliban in this picture? Unlike 
in the Abu Ghraib pictures, the bodies are not at the centre of the frame but on the edge, 
and in some publications, cropped out altogether. The faces are not hooded but blurred; 
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from what one can detect, they are bloody and mutilated from battle. Indeed, rather than 
the faces, it is the hands which identify these figures as human, and which reach out in 
appeal. The hand of one fighter stretches out away from the body; the hand of another is 
curled over his stomach. Unlike the marines, their bodies are fully covered, ‘decent’ 
except for a few inches of midriff where one fighter’s shirt has been drawn up in the 
conflict. They have no weapons, unlike the marines. Instead, bloodstained scarves and 
unfurled turbans surround them, but – maybe significantly – don’t cover them. The 
ostensible effect of the photograph is to turn the Taliban into unidentifiable objects, a blur 
of blood and clothing; the inadvertent force is to allow their humanity to return, 
uncannily, with the outstretched hand. The hand gesture, then, unremarked by all 
comments on the image, lingers with me as a quasi-punctum in Barthes’ terms, an almost 
unnameable detail which is a ‘symptom of disturbance’.xliii  (As another aside, one 
wonders at this point why Levinas places such emphasis upon the face as the site of 
expression and appeal, and does not consider the hand as another traditional instrument of 
supplication?) 
 
Greek tragedy, and Antigone in particular, is very concerned with what can be 
seen and what cannot. It is concerned with the need to bring things to the light, with the 
desire to be witnessed and with the significance of withholding that act of witnessing. 
Antigone wants her act of burying Polyneices to be made public, to be ‘proclaimed’ to 
all’.xliv  Creon is determined that she should be buried alive away from the city, that her 
death should not be seen: 
 I will take her down some wild, desolate path  
 never trod by men, and wall her up alive 
in a rocky vault. and set out short rations, 
just the measure piety demands 
to keep the entire city free (ὑπεκφύγῃ: 776) of defilement.xlv  
Creon’s evasiveness is emphasised by the verb pheugein here, a word which is repeated 
many times in the whole play, indicating the desire to escape recognition and 
responsibility.
xlvi
  When Antigone comes out to give her final speech as she is being led 
to her death, she asks the chorus to witness her (ὁρᾶτ᾽ἔμ’: 806), but it is possible (as I 
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saw in a production recently to great effect) for the chorus specifically not to look at 
Antigone at this point, to avert their gaze, and just occasionally not to be able to prevent 
their eyes gliding onto her lone figure.
xlvii
  
 
Looking at the enemy, actually seeing his face, noticing the details of his person – 
his clothes, his customs, his feelings – can lead to paradoxical, contradictory effects. It 
can apparently elicit compassion, with the Levinasian force of confronting and respecting 
the Other. Or it can result in a grotesque objectification, a humiliating transformation of 
the hostile combatant into a fantastical display of the subject’s worst fears. Aeschylus’ 
play The Persians, which dramatises the defeat of Xerxes, the king of Persia, and his 
army at the battle of Salamis, compelled the ancient Athenians to look at their, very 
recent, enemy. That the effect of such act of looking in the theatre is ambivalent is 
testified to by the production history of the play. The ancient tragedy has been performed 
both as a morale boosting way of grotesquely ridiculing the enemy and as a means of 
looking at the enemy and eliciting compassion. In 1983, for example, in the last years of 
the Cold War, the Berliner Ensemble in East Germany portrayed the protagonists – the 
Persian king and queen - as examples of western decadence. This was effectively a 
transformation of the enemy into satirical spectacle.
xlviii
   But in contrast, the 1993 
production by Peter Sellars, which toured the US and Europe not long after the first Gulf 
War, aimed to compel its audience to think about the humanity of the enemy, by casting 
the protagonists sympathetically as Iraqis. ‘In America’, commented Sellars, ‘the war in 
Iraq was shown with no Iraqis at all – dead or alive […] We’re saying come and meet a 
few’.xlix Seeing the enemy from their point of view, according to Sellars, effectively 
awakens compassion and ‘tests people’s tolerance of different opinions and of difference 
in general’. Thus it is ‘crucial to the functioning of democracy’.l 
 
So looking at the enemy can lead to very different, contradictory effects.  But not 
looking at the enemy is also multivalent.  It can be interpreted as a form of neglect, the 
Other registered as insignificant because it is displaced to the realm of the invisible. 
There was no body count performed for both the Iraqi and Afghan victims of the two 
wars of the last decade - a decision announced by Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on 
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CBS news in March 2002 with the words ‘I don’t do body counts’ and echoed by his 
chief General in Afghanistan, General Tommy Franks, a few days later. The policy, by 
the US Defence department, of not counting the enemy combatant and civilian casualties 
has been interpreted by many as indicative of a form of blindness to the human cost of 
US military intervention, a troubling indifference which has been complicated – and 
made more troubling  – by the revelation from Wikileaks that allegedly the Pentagon did 
in fact count the enemy dead, but deliberately withheld publication. In this case, the 
invisibility of the enemy in photographic terms might indicate a similar blindness, 
indifference or deliberate repression.
li
 But on the other hand, not looking at the enemy 
evades the possibility of familiarising him, of rendering him understandable through 
caricature or the projection of exotic spectacle.  The photograph after all, according to 
Barthes, is an ‘institutional activity’ whose ‘function is to integrate man, to reassure 
him’.lii If one accepts Barthes’ notion of the photograph’s capacity to pacify and 
sublimate the traumatic, then one must consider the lack of an image of the enemy as a 
failed attempt at sublimation, as a continuing haunting presence of the traumatic.  The 
impact of a figure remaining invisible, therefore, is ambivalent but should not be 
underestimated. ‘There is real power in remaining unmarked’, observed Peggy Phelan in 
her fascinating claim for the value of invisibility in photography and performance, ‘and 
there are serious limitations to visual representation as a political goal’.liii Remaining 
unmarked allows the subject to remain un-trapped by surveillance, not co-opted by 
hegemonic culture, unseen and unknown. 
 
In their concern with the compulsion to see and the power of not seeing, Greek 
tragedy and some types of photography are illuminating.
liv
  On the one hand, both forms 
of representation confront suffering head-on, metaphorically with their eyes open. ‘[Don] 
McCullin serves as an eye we cannot shut’, wrote John Berger, in the context of a 
discussion of how we confront shocking images. ‘Such photographs […] are printed on 
the black curtain which is drawn across what we choose to forget or refuse to know’.lv  
The camera, like the eyes of the mask of Greek tragedy, witnesses events  ‘because it is 
created with open eyes’ and ‘faces up to the muses’, according to Tony Harrisonlvi. But 
on the other hand, both Greek tragedy and photography can also register its lack of 
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response, its moment of turning away, its drawing of the ‘black curtain’.lvii  Thus the 
chorus at the end of Oedipus, twist and turn towards and away from the sight of the 
blinded and cursed Oedipus, a polluting and taboo figure: ‘Ah, ah, unhappy one, I cannot 
even bear to look on you, though I wish to ask you many questions and to learn many 
answers and perceive many things; such is the horror you inspire in me!’lviii  And thus the 
Pete Souza photograph of the Situation Room catches the moment when Clinton puts her 
hand over her mouth, a hand which could have easily also been placed over her eyes. 
 
The Pete Souza photograph did, of course, have its uncanny double. I want to 
conclude with the other image of viewing and not viewing the enemy which has emerged 
recently, to think about the role of revelation, (non)recognition and fear shaping our 
visual grasp of the decade-long ‘war on terror’. When the Navy Seals stormed the Bin 
Laden compound in Pakistan, they found a stash of home videos. Amongst these was film 
footage of Osama Bin Laden, sitting on an old carpet in a dingy room, wrapped in a 
blanket and watching a television. In lieu of the photograph of the dead Osama, the 
Pentagon decided to release this video in May 2011, with the soundtrack censored so that 
we see but do not hear the scene. The inverted echo of the Pete Souza image is striking.  
Unlike the full view of Obama in the Situation Room, we see Osama from behind, and 
therefore only his back and side profile, not his face. But we see very clearly the 
television screen that he is watching; it is projecting images of both Osama and President 
Obama, against a backdrop of the events of 9/11 and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq.   
 
These two images, the situation room photo and the compound home movie, 
testify to a double failure or refusal to see, covered by an obsession with viewing. In the 
first, the ambivalent possibilities of depicting the spectators of a hidden picture aim to 
cultivate the notion of the enemy as opaque, mysterious, fearful but also insignificant. 
The spectating group are formed, and conformed, by what they see and recognise and 
fear or hate; our attention is carefully composed to be about them, not about what they are 
watching, although as I have argued, the occluded television leaves open the space for 
speculation, for pity and fear and uncertainty.  In the second, haphazardly-shot image, the 
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spectator, Bin Laden, is also formed by what he sees, the narcissism of watching oneself 
on television not lost on the video’s many commentators.  The film was released, 
presumably, to make him an object of ridicule; to what depths has our fearful enemy been 
reduced!  But the gap between the visible television image and the shadowy, unseen 
viewer actually demands what the Pentagon never envisaged, a sense of the pathetic, of 
pathos, or, dare we say, of pity? All we see is Bin Laden’s hand clutching the television 
remote control, flicking from one channel to the next, although all seem to offer the same 
visual library.  Choice but no choice, a decision over a stock of images already archived, 
a hand which seeks, through the touch of a button, a visual recognition of polarised 
enmity:  such is the tragic spectral image which haunts the Pete Souza iconic 
representation of the war. One image, it seems to me, calls up the other, invoking the 
hidden blind spots that are paradoxically foundational for the politically useful forces of 
fear and Cavellian doubt and certainty. In viewing these two images we are forced to face 
questions that are central to tragedy, about our sense of ourselves as a society, what we 
choose to recognise and what we do not, and, in an era of mass media and multiple 
images, the self-conscious and ambiguous function of bearing witness today. 
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